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NAMING YOUNG OFFENDERS: IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH FOR 
REFORM 
JODIE O’LEARY* 
Recently it was reported that Queensland’s Liberal National Party Government is considering 
proposing amendments to Queensland’s juvenile justice legislation. The proposal is to expand 
the ability to name recidivist young offenders. This article suggests that such a proposal does 
not align with the evidence regarding juvenile development and offending, and will be 
ineffective as a deterrent, as well as increasing stigmatizing potential. The article considers 
whether the provisions on naming in other States and Territories are better aligned with the 
available evidence. It concludes that the approach taken in the majority of jurisdictions, 
which rests on a presumption against naming, should be considered best practice.  
Calls for criminal justice reform, involving the public naming of young offenders, are often 
made as part of a tough-on-crime, strong law and order, political stance. Some argue that 
allowing the publication of identifying details of young offenders (‘naming’), provides for 
greater accountability and acts as a deterrent, both specifically and generally.1 
In 2012 the Queensland Government was reported to be considering proposing 
amendments to the naming provisions in Queensland.2 This was recently reiterated in the 
Government’s ‘Safer Streets Crime Action Plan – Youth Justice.’3 The proposal would extend 
the ability for Queensland courts to name to recidivist young offenders. This is not the first 
time that the Liberal National Party has made such a proposal. Prior to the introduction of 
the current Queensland provisions, the then-opposition leader wanted the court’s 
discretion to name to include recidivist non-violent young offenders who continue ‘to 
offend and endanger the community while hiding behind the veil of anonymity.’4 However, 
at the time of writing, further details of the Queensland Government’s proposal were 
unclear.  
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1
 For a brief summary of this argument see Braithwaite J, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989) pp 19-20.  
2
 See eg, Remeikis A, ‘Juvenile Offenders in Sights’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 15 July 2012, 
www.smh.com.au/national/juvenile-offenders-in-sights-20120714-223eg.html#ixzz25LqYTqsl. 
3
 Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Government of Queensland, Safer Streets Crime Action Plan – 
Youth Justice (March 2013), www.justice.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/177775/safer-streets-crime-
action-plan-youth-justice.pdf. The Government noted that its review of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) would 
examine ‘expanding the existing naming laws so that the names of repeat young offenders can be made public’ 
at 7.       
4
 Dixon N, ‘Naming Juvenile Offenders – Juvenile Justice Amendment Bill 2002 (Qld)’ Research Brief No 22, 
Queensland Parliamentary Library, Queensland Parliament, 2002) at 10.  
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Queensland is not the only Australian state to revisit its naming provisions in the recent past. 
In 2008 the Standing Committee on Law and Justice in New South Wales considered the 
operation of the naming provisions in that state.5 Continued appeals for reform to target 
young offending are unsurprising. Such rhetoric is politically expedient for a number of 
reasons: 
1. While juveniles only comprise a small percentage of all offenders,6 proportionately, 
persons aged between 15-19 years commit more crime than those in other age groups;7  
2. Young offenders are unable to vote to voice their disapproval of policies that impact 
upon them; and 
3. The youth justice system is sometimes perceived as a soft approach in terms of criminal 
justice. For example, Queensland’s Attorney-General was reported as saying:  ‘We've 
heard on too many occasions young people who are coming through our courts who 
have just laughed at the sort of slap on the wrist that they ultimately get.’8 
Yet these reasons highlight the need to exercise caution when it comes to youth justice 
reform. The fact that juveniles commit, proportionately, more crime than persons of other 
ages suggests that they face unique circumstances. Their lack of voice in important decision 
making also recognises that they are unique, such limitation predicated on societal concern 
about their immature abilities. Further, recognition of these developmental characteristics 
and their impact on participation in criminal behaviour underlies the special system of 
criminal justice for juveniles in Australia and elsewhere. Unless the reasons for treating 
juveniles differently have become obsolete, continued reflection on juveniles’ development 
and their uniqueness is necessary in policy decisions about combating juvenile offending.   
This article analyses the arguments for and against the naming of young offenders in light of 
the available criminological and developmental research. Particularly, the article considers 
                                                          
5
 Legislative Council Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Parliament of New South Wales, The Prohibition 
on the Publication of Names of Children Involved in Criminal Proceedings, Report No 35 (April 2008) ultimately 
recommended that the protection afforded to juveniles against publication be maintained and further 
prohibitions against publication be extended to cover the period prior to charges being laid. This followed an 
earlier report by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Young Offenders, Report No 104 (2005) at 
[8.22]-[8.33] that also rebuffed any relaxation of the protection against publication. The Government 
supported the recommendation to maintain the protection but did not support the recommendation to 
extend the prohibition to the pre-charge period: New South Wales Government, Response to the Inquiry into 
the Prohibition of Names of Children Involved in Criminal Proceedings: Report 35,  
www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/a6e0bf2fbb2c4cc5ca25743900104238/$FILE/08
1030%20Government%20response.pdf.  
6
 For example, in Queensland, between 2006 and 2012, juvenile offenders (under 17 years of age) accounted 
for 5.44% of the total offending population. That is, there were 66 497 juveniles who appeared before the 
Children’s Court in that period while there were 1 156 849 adult offenders. This data was obtained from the 
‘Criminal Lodgements’ appendices in the Annual Magistrate’s Court Reports in the relevant years available at 
www.courts.qld.gov.au/about/publications#Magistrates%20Court%20Annual%20Reports.  
7
 Richards K, Australian Institute of Criminology, “What Makes Juvenile Offenders Different from Adult 
Offenders?” (February 2011) Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 409 at 1,  
www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tandi/401-420/tandi409.html.  
8
 Remeikis, n 2. 
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the arguments that: naming will deter future juvenile offending; and conversely, naming will 
label or stigmatise juveniles, cementing their place as future offenders. It is argued that the 
Queensland Government’s proposed expansion of the naming provisions is inappropriate. 
The existing Australian approaches to naming juvenile offenders are assessed to determine 
which, if any, aligns with the available evidence about juvenile development and offending. 
I DEVELOPMENTS IN DEVELOPMENT 
As previously stated, youth justice in Australia recognises that young people’s participation 
in crime may be affected by their developmental stage. Although there is some conflicting 
evidence,9 it is generally thought that involvement in crime is something that most people 
grow out of, it is ephemeral.10 Recent developmental neuroscience research illuminates 
some explanations for the transitory nature of juvenile offending. The adolescent period 
precedes full brain development. Changes around the time of puberty, leading to sensation 
seeking and reward orientation,11  
precede the development of regulatory competence in a manner that creates a 
disjunction between the adolescent’s affective experience and his or her ability to 
regulate arousal and motivation...[This] may well create a situation in which one is 
starting an engine without yet having a skilled driver behind the wheel.12 
Steinberg further explains that changes in the brain’s socio-emotional system occur in early 
adolescence, while changes in the cognitive control system occur later, in late adolescence 
or early adulthood. As such, there is a gap or period of time where there is a ‘heightened 
vulnerability to risky and reckless behaviour.’13 The Supreme Court of the United States 
accepted the impact of such research upon juveniles’ culpability and the resulting 
implications for sentencing juveniles in Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005) and Graham v 
Florida, 130 SCt (2011). Most recently in Miller v Alabama, 132 SCt 2455 (2012) the Court 
                                                          
9
 Weatherburn D, McGrath A and Bartels L, “Three Dogmas of Juvenile Justice” (2012) 35(3) UNSWLJ 779 at 
800 review past studies with conflicting findings and present their own evidence that the majority of the 8813 
juvenile offenders who were either cautioned, referred to youth justice conference or appeared in a New 
South Wales court in 1999 had reoffended within ten years. The limitation of this study though is that while it 
is clear that juveniles have reoffended, what is not clear is when. Indeed those whose initial contact was as a 
10-12 year old were the most likely of any age group to be reconvicted. This could certainly have occurred 
prior to achieving full maturity levels.  
10
 See discussion of this in Richards, n 7 at 2; see also Mulvey EP et al, “Trajectories of Desistance and 
Continuity in Antisocial Behavior Following Court Adjudication among Serious Adolescent Offenders” (2010) 
22(2) Dev Psychopathol 453 at 454 citing, inter alia, Piquero AR et al, “Assessing the Impact of Exposure of 
Time and Incapacitation on Longitudinal Trajectories of Criminal Offending” (2001) 16(1) J of Adolescent Res 
54, who note that ‘less than half of serious adolescent offenders likely will continue their adult criminal career 
into their 20s.’ Mulvey et al’s study of juveniles following court adjudication also found at 470 that ‘the general 
trend among [serious adolescent offenders] is to reduce their level of involvement in antisocial activities.’ 
11
 For a discussion of developmental factors affecting the reward orientation of adolescents see Galvan A, 
“Adolescent Development of the Reward System” (2010) 4 Front Hum Neurosci 1.  
12
 Steinberg L, “Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence” (2005) 9(2) Trends Cogn Sci 69. This 
article provides a review of the empirical research underlying this idea.  
13
 Steinberg L, “A Social Neuroscience Perspective of Adolescent Risk-Taking” (2008) 28 Dev Rev 78 at 83. 
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quoted from the American Psychological Association brief that identified increasing clarity in 
the research that ‘adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and systems related 
to higher-order executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk 
avoidance.’14 The Court noted that ‘the science and social science supporting Roper 's and 
Graham 's conclusions have become even stronger.’15 Those considering youth justice 
reform should consider the interplay of these developments and the unique position of 
juveniles. This article does just that, looking first at the theory of deterrence as a 
justification for naming young offenders.  
II DETERRING JUVENILES 
Deterrence is a feature of proposals to name young offenders. To act as a specific deterrent 
the naming of a young offender should deter that particular juvenile from future offending. 
The Queensland Government’s proposed expanded ability to name may result in a similar 
practice to that surrounding the recording of criminal convictions. That is, once a criminal 
conviction has been recorded there is little argument as to why all subsequent offending 
should not attract a corresponding record. Likewise, once a juvenile has been named a court 
would be likely to again name that juvenile if they appear before the court for a subsequent 
offence.16 Knowing this, it may be suggested that the juvenile would be less likely to 
reoffend. However, there is a significant flaw in this line of thought. A juvenile who has 
already been named once arguably has little to lose. Once named the juvenile’s reputation 
has already been tarnished. His or her name may potentially already appear in the public 
domain for all and sundry to see. The specific deterrence value could only then impact upon 
a juvenile offender who is on the verge of this recidivist line in the sand. It will only result 
from the implicit or explicit threat made by the court that if the juvenile is to appear before 
it again they can expect to be named.   
General deterrence aims to educate would-be offenders as to the consequences of such 
behaviour in the hope that should they be tempted they will rationally choose to refrain. 
The value of naming as a general deterrent is arguably less than as a specific deterrent as 
the present ability to publish information, apart from identification details, means that the 
necessary information regarding the offence and the sentence can already be conveyed to 
other prospective offenders. Alternatively, it may be proposed that knowing others have 
been named for particular conduct provides a further level of severity to the sentence and 
will deter others from engaging in similar conduct for fear of attracting a similar result. 
                                                          
14
 Brief for American Psychological Association et al as Amici Curiae 3, 4, cited in Miller v Alabama, 132 SCt 
2455 (2012) at fn 5. 
15
 Miller v Alabama, 132 SCt 2455 (2012) at fn 5. 
16
 This has been the experience in the Northern Territory, see Duncan Chappell and Robyn Lincoln, ‘Naming 
and Shaming of Indigenous Youth in the Justice System: An Exploratory Study of the Impact in the Northern 
Territory’(Project Report, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 21 May 2012) at 
93, quoting a legal practitioner: ‘I guess the hard one is when someone has already been in trouble before and 
by that stage the court says well, no, you’ve had your opportunity you’ve been in trouble before what good 
would it do for us to suppress the name now.’ 
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However, the addition of naming upon the severity of the sentence could be said to be 
irrelevant to deterrence, as certainty of sentence has been found to act as a deterrent 
rather than severity of punishment.17  
Importantly, when considering either specific or general deterrence aims of naming juvenile 
offenders, research findings indicate that juveniles partake in dangerous or risky acts 
despite knowing the risks involved.18 Therefore, it is arguable that despite knowing the risk 
that they will be caught offending and punished, even to the extent of having their names 
published, juvenile offenders will not be deterred. This is particularly so given that it has 
been found that juveniles are more capable of learning from positive consequences such as 
rewards rather than negative or punitive consequences of behaviour,19 and because 
adolescents are less likely to consider long-term impacts or consequences of their 
behaviour.20  
Put another way, in earlier literature it was theorised that juveniles are egocentric and 
experience an ‘imaginary audience’ which spurs on their Icarus-type ideations, so that they 
do not realise their own limitations or vulnerabilities. 21 Subsequent research debunked this 
theory, finding that juveniles (like adults) overestimate risk.22  Nevertheless, knowing of the 
risks, juveniles in socially or emotionally exciting situations will disregard them.23 
Adolescents do not ‘simply rationally weigh the relative risks and consequences of their 
behaviour – their actions are largely influenced by feelings and social influences.’24  They are 
more likely to be influenced by excitement or stress when making decisions, especially in 
                                                          
17
 See discussion in Alexander T and Bagaric M, “(Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t Work – and What it 
Means for Sentencing” (2011) 35 Crim LJ 269; see also McGrath A, “Offenders’ Perceptions of the Sentencing 
Process: A Study of Deterrence and Stigmatisation in the New South Wales Children’s Court” (2009) 42(1) 
ANZJC 24. McGrath supports earlier work of Nagin D, “Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the 
Twenty-first Century” in Tonry M (ed), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1998) and Von Hirsch A et al, Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An Analysis of Recent 
Research (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999) propounding this view: at 25. The alternative argument would be that 
publication of names would add to the perceived certainty of punishment, especially if one considers the need 
for information to be transmitted for the effective operation of the concept of general deterrence. 
Nevertheless, as propounded earlier, publishing information that a juvenile has been convicted and sentenced 
would arguably provide just as adequate information for general deterrence, without the need for naming.    
18
 See discussion in Cauffman E and Steinberg L, “The Cognitive and Affective Influences on Adolescent 
Decision-Making” (1995) 68 Temple LR 1763.  
19
 Albert D and Steinberg L, “Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence” (2011) 21(1) J Res Adolescence 
211 at 219.  
20
 Steinberg L, “Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice” (2009) 5 Annu Rev Clin Psycho 47 at 57. 
21
 Arnett J, “Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective” (1992) 12 Dev Rev 339 and Elkind 
D, ‘Egocentrism in Adolescence’ (1967) 38 Child Dev 1025 cited in Sturman D and Moghaddam B, “The 
Neurobiology of Adolescence: Changes in Brain Architecture, Functional Dynamics, and Behavioral Tendencies” 
(2011) 35 Neurosci Biobehav Rev 1704 at 1705.  
22
 For example, De Bruin WB et al, “Can Adolescents Predict Significant Life Events?” (2007) 41 J Adolescent 
Health 208 cited in Sturman and Moghaddam, n 21. See also Albert and Steinberg, n 19 at 213 for further 
sources supporting this proposition.  
23
 For a discussion of the research findings in this area see Sturman and Moghaddam, n 21 at 1706.  
24
 Steinberg, n 12 at 72.   
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the presence of peers,25 factors which are potentially present either in isolation or in 
combination at the time of offending.26 
Naming juvenile offenders will provide the juveniles with a real audience. This may increase 
the perceived reward of a risky decision to offend.27 Studies show that juveniles are 
attracted to those engaged in antisocial behaviour,28 and that juveniles consider peer 
interactions as highly rewarding.29 As such, a juvenile may perceive the fact that they will be 
named as a benefit of engaging in crime rather than be deterred from doing so:30 
 [A] delinquent attracts the attention of peers, ... audience members take note of this 
 phenomenon, and ... they therefore increase their delinquency in proportion to their 
 own desire for peer attention.31  
While not determinative that naming juveniles is an ineffective deterrent, it is nevertheless 
informative to recognise that the Australian state or territory with the most expansive 
naming laws, the Northern Territory,32 also ‘consistently rates among the highest in 
proportion of offending young people and has the highest proportion of young people in 
detention.’33  
Even if one considers that deterrence is an appropriate justification, proportionality must 
remain the overarching principle in sentencing. In Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 
465 at [8] the Court confirmed an earlier decision that proportionality could not be 
                                                          
25
 Zimring F, American Youth Violence (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) cited in O’Brien L et al, 
“Adolescents Prefer More Immediate Rewards When in the Presence of their Peers” (2011) 21(4) J Res 
Adolescence 747 at 747.  
26
 See discussion in Steinberg L, “Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives from Brain and Behavioural 
Science” (2007) 16(2) Curr Dir Psychol Sci 55 at 56-57.   
27
 Interviews reported in Chappell and Lincoln, n 16 at 95, expressed this issue: ‘I know there was this issue 
about gangs... that there were names released in that whole process, you know front page, this person has 
been arrested and that person has been charged, you know it kind of turned them into mini-Gods...they were 
quite happy for them to be getting that kind of publicity, kind of generating this name for themselves.’ 
However, the fact that adolescents are more attracted to immediate rewards suggests that any perception of a 
future benefit like this may not be at the forefront of juvenile’s minds. For research regarding the adolescent’s 
preference for immediate rewards see Steinberg L et al, “Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay 
Discounting” (2009) 80 Child Dev 28.  
28
 See discussion in Steinberg L n 20 at 57 citing Moffit (1993); see also Rebellon C, “Do Adolescents Engage in 
Delinquency to Attract the Social Attention of Peers? An Extension and Longitudinal Test of the Social 
Reinforcement Hypothesis” (2006) 43 J Res Crime Delinq 387 at 402.  
29
 Csikszentmihalyi M, Larson R and Prescott S, “The Ecology of Adolescent Experience” (1977) 6 J Youth 
Adolescence 218 cited in O’Brien et al, n 25 at 751.  
30
 Crofts T and Witzleb N, “’Naming and shaming’ in Western Australia: Prohibited Behaviour Orders, Publicity 
and the Decline of Youth Anonymity” (2011) 35 Crim LJ 34 at 41. 
31
 Rebellon, n 28 at 403.   
32
 Those laws are discussed in detail below.  
33
 O’Leary J et al, Submission in Response to the Safer Streets Crime Action Plan – Youth Justice (28 June 2013) 
at 10, lawgovpolicy.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/yjrd-submission.pdf  referring to the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Recorded Crime Offenders – 2001 – 2012 (2013) 
www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Products/778845BE359BD2E2CA257B1F00100FFB?opendocument and 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Juvenile Detention Population in Australia (2012) Juvenile Justice 
Series No. 11, www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129542551.  
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jeopardised to protect ‘society from the risk of recidivism on the part of the offender.’ 
Although that decision related to the appropriate length of an order of imprisonment, the 
same could be said about increasing the severity of punishment through naming an offender. 
The Queensland Government apparently wants to make the punishment of juveniles more 
than a ‘slap on the wrist.’ The Government sees some retributive value in naming. There is 
therefore a danger that the proposed amendment, which would target recidivist actors 
rather than their specific acts, could lead to inconsistent, disproportionate outcomes. In 
addition, juveniles, by virtue of their developmental immaturity, are usually less 
blameworthy and, compared to adults, not as culpable for their offending.34 Adding naming 
to another sentence order could potentially ignore this distinction. To avoid this, courts may 
ameliorate a sentence taking into account the detrimental effect of naming.35 This may 
result in a reduced sentence, which could undermine the rehabilitative purposes of the 
juvenile justice system.36   
As articulated in the Supreme Court of the United States ‘the same characteristics that 
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less 
susceptible to deterrence.’37 Naming is ineffective as a deterrent and its combination with 
other orders may render the result potentially disproportionate to the crime. Nevertheless, 
proponents for naming may argue that such orders are not punitive in nature.38 After all, 
they will say, naming is par for the course in adult courts. Even so, there are other negative 
impacts of naming juveniles related to labelling them as an offender.  
III A PUBLIC LABEL AS AN OFFENDER 
The main criticism of naming juvenile offenders is that doing so will further label a juvenile 
as criminal and such stigmatisation will be a recurring self-fulfilling prophecy. As 
Tannenbaum suggested ‘[t]he person becomes the thing he is described as being.’39 
Labelling has been said to negatively alter an individual’s identity and exclude them from 
conventional groups and activities.40 The more who know about the criminal behaviour the 
less likely the person will be able to reintegrate into society and the more attractive the pull 
                                                          
34
 See discussion about the value of retribution for juveniles in Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005), 571. 
35
 See Application by John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd re MSK, MAK, MMK and MRK [2006] NSWCCA 386 (1 
December 2006) [18] ‘where, as part of a distinct statutory process, public shaming is to occur, that could 
influence the sentencing judge to ameliorate the sentence that would otherwise be appropriate.’ 
36
 An example of this is reported in Chappell and Lincoln, n 16 at 83, in the quote from an interviewee that a 
juvenile – ‘walked away with a good behaviour bond because there had been so much naming in the media, 
that was mentioned as punishment that he had already received, and that was unquantifiable.’ Good 
behaviour bonds are traditionally not thought of as particularly rehabilitative, unlike supervised orders such as 
probation.   
37
 Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005), 571.  
38
 Such a justification was provided for upholding the constitutional validity of sex offender registration laws in 
various states in the United States: see Kushner I, “Megan’s Law: Branding Juveniles as Sex Offenders” (2004) 
23 Dev Mental Health L 10.  
39
 Tannenbaum F, Crime and the Community (Ginn, Boston, 1938) p 20, cited in Braithwaite, n 1 at 17.  
40
 Bouffard LA and Piquero NL, “Defiance Theory and Life Course Explanations of Persistent Offending” (2010) 
56 Crime Delinquency 227 at 232. 
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of deviant groups who will provide alternative support. The United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (‘Beijing Rules’)41 embedded this 
theory in Rule 8: 
8.1 The juvenile’s right to privacy shall be respected at all stages in order to avoid 
harm being caused to him or her by the process of labelling.  
8.2 In principle, no information that may lead to the identification of a juvenile 
offender shall be published.42      
The commentary to this rule stresses that  
[y]oung persons are particularly susceptible to stigmatization. Criminological 
research into labelling processes has provided evidence of the detrimental effects (of 
different kinds) resulting from the permanent identification of young persons as 
“delinquent” or “criminal”.43 
This theory has been reconceptualised and refined subsequent to the General Assembly’s 
adoption of the Beijing Rules. Braithwaite, for example, provides a distinction between 
negative stigmatising labelling and what he posits as reintegrative shaming. His concept, 
similarly to the defiance theory advanced by Sherman, suggests that particular contextual 
factors may influence whether the sanctions imposed increase the risk of reoffending or 
whether they provide an adequate deterrent. To be reintegrative, Braithwaite notes that 
the shame must be attached to the act rather than the actor.44 The shaming must precede 
‘efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community of law-abiding or respectable 
citizens’,45 which aim to reduce the appeal of the criminal subculture or group.46 Shame 
attached to any sanction is more likely to have a positive impact if the offender is 
intertwined within interdependent relationships or is bonded firmly to others in their 
community.47 In support, Sherman discusses various empirical studies which found that 
‘sanctions cause more crime among social out-groups and less crime among social in-
                                                          
41
 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, GA Res 40/33, UN GAOR, 
40
th
 sess, 96
th
 plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/40/33 (29 November 1985). 
42
 The right to privacy regarding juveniles accused of criminal offences is enshrined in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 
1990) art 40(2)(b)(vii).   
43
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, GA Res 40/33, UN GAOR, 
40
th
 sess, 96
th
 plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/40/33 (29 November 1985), commentary to Rule 8.  
44
 Braithwaite, n 1 at 101, similarly see Sherman L, “Defiance, Deterrence and Irrelevance: A Theory of the 
Criminal Sanction” (1993) 30 J Res Crime Delinq 445 at 460 who notes that defiance occurs when the ‘offender 
defines the sanction as stigmatizing and rejecting a person, not a lawbreaking act.’ Although note the research 
of McGrath, n 17 at 40 which found no support for Braithwaite’s proposition that reintegrative shaming would 
be less damaging than labelling per se.   
45
 Braithwaite, n 1 at 100.  
46
 Braithwaite, n 1 at 102.  
47
 Braithwaite, n 1 at 81 suggests that deterrence is more effective where persons are in relationships of 
interdependency and Sherman, n 44 at 460 argues that persons are defiant if they are poorly bonded. 
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groups.’48 Recent research partially substantiates Sherman’s theory, finding that those 
offenders who perceived a sanction as unfair and who were poorly bonded ‘experienced 
higher rates of offending and slower desistance over the life course compared to those who 
perceived their treatment as fair or were well bonded.’49  
Naming recidivist juveniles in the way proposed by the Queensland Government is not 
reintegrative. The proposal would remove the emphasis from the nature of the crime, and 
instead focus on the actor. It is unclear whether the proposal includes corresponding efforts 
to ensure the offender is not further isolated from the community. But there is nothing to 
suggest that publication would be controlled to be orientated towards the juvenile’s 
immediate community with whom they are interdependent. Instead, the media’s ability to 
publish identifying material makes the impact far reaching and impersonal. Having the 
naming provisions apply to some juvenile offenders but not others, even in relation to a 
similar offence, may result in perceptions of unfair treatment among those named. The 
impact on recidivist juvenile offenders, who are often poorly bonded,50 and whose fall back 
support network will necessarily be a deviant social out-group, can only be stigmatising and 
have the converse result to the desired reduction in offending.    
The negative impacts of labelling are not confined to naming. Labelling can occur at other 
stops along the way, such as from the arrest and appearance at court.  A New South Wales 
study, specific to that state’s Children’s Court, found offenders did not perceive their 
experience in court stigmatising of itself.51 Findings that juvenile offenders are not 
necessarily stigmatised by court appearances may be because specialised Magistrates and 
other actors in children’s courts attempt to use language that avoids associated stigma. 
Such a favourable environment in a children’s court, along with the inability of the media to 
name juvenile offenders, may partially explanain why juveniles have not experienced courts 
to be any more stigmatising than conferences. On the other hand, naming by an 
unconstrained media, who often fancy portraying juvenile offenders with emotive language, 
would seem to be more likely to stigmatise a juvenile. 
McGrath found that where a juvenile did feel stigmatised they were more likely to 
reoffend.52 This supports earlier research, which found that feelings of shame (attached to 
                                                          
48
 Sherman, n 44 at 450-453; see also Bernburg JG, Krohn MD and Rivera GJ, “Official Labeling, Criminal 
Embeddedness, and Susbequent Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test of Labeling Theory” (2006) 43 J Res Crime 
Delinq 67 at 77 whose research supports ‘the hypothesis that juvenile justice intervention is associated with 
increased probability of subsequent involvement in deviant networks.’ 
49
 Bouffard and Piquero, n 40 at 244.  
50
 Bonding may result from employment stability, marriage and higher levels of educational attainment, see 
discussion in Bouffard and Piquero, n 40 at 236. 
51
 McGrath, n 17 at 39. Although note that the author identifies at 39 that the methodology, which involved 
questioning juveniles immediately after sentence, may have resulted in an underestimation of the levels of 
stigmatisation as ‘it may be … that feelings of stigmatisation take longer to emerge, and only become apparent 
when the young person has a chance to experience the disapprobation of their family and peers in the days 
and weeks following the court appearance.’ 
52
 McGrath, n 17 at 35, 39-40.  
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both stable and global personal characteristics that are perceived to be difficult to change) 
lead to higher rates of recidivism.53 Naming offenders will ‘promote feelings of shame ... by 
implying that criminal behaviour cannot be altered.’54  
The results from empirical research conducted around community notification of sex 
offenders may be extrapolated and have some application to the naming of juvenile 
offenders. That research notes that ‘registration and community notification appears to 
have little effect on sex offender recidivism.’55 While these laws arguably go a step further 
than public naming, which is generally an option for adult accused anyway, impacts such as 
negative psychological and social consequences that attached to community notification 
could also apply to juvenile offenders who are named at the whim of media organisations or 
others. 56 For example, juveniles may experience interruptions to their schooling due to 
published information regarding their offending, which may in turn impact on their 
employment opportunities.57 Such harmful impacts, which often impede rehabilitation,58 
when combined with questionable evidence of deterrence, may be justified in some 
respects by the high levels of public support for community notification laws,59 and the need 
for public safety. However, contrarily, the public has expressed support for the rehabilitative 
aims of the juvenile justice system.60  
                                                          
53
 Hosser D, Windzio M and Greve W, “Guilt and Shame as Predictors of Recidivism: A Longitudinal Study with 
Young Prisoners” (2008) 35 Crim Justice Behav 138 at 148. 
54
 Hosser et al, n 53 at 149.  
55
 Lasher MP and McGrath RJ, “The Impact of Community Notification on Sex Offender Reintegration: A 
Quantitative Review of the Research Literature” (2012) 56(1) Int J Offender Ther 6 at 7.  
56
 The negative psychological consequences experienced by participants in the community notification 
program included ‘loss of friends, feeling lonely and isolated, embarrassment and loss of hope.’ The negative 
social consequences included job loss, negative impacts on accommodation arrangements and harassment or 
threats against the offender or their family and loss of social supports: Lasher and McGrath, n 55 at 20. 
57
 See discussion in Bernburg JG and Krohn MD, “Labeling, Life Chances, and Adult Crime: The Direct and 
Indirect Effects of Official Intervention in Adolescence on Crime in Early Adulthood” (2003) 41 Criminology 
1287.  
58
 There is evidence linking these negative consequences to increased rates of reoffending: see Freeman N and 
Sandler J, “The Adam Walsh Act: A False Sense of Security or an Effective Public Policy Initiative?” (2010) 21 
CPJR 31 cited in Lasher and McGrath, n 55 at 23.  
59
 See discussion in Lasher and McGrath, n 55 at 9. 
60
 See eg, Piquero A and Steinberg L, “Public Preferences for Rehabilitation Versus Incarceration of Juvenile 
Offenders” (2010) 38 J Crim Just 1 at 5 which found that generally the public was willing to pay more in taxes 
for rehabilitation than incarceration. See also, Elizabeth Moore, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research,  
Restorative Justice Initiatives: Public Opinion and Support in New South Wales (2012) Bureau Brief – Issue 
Paper 77, www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/BB77.pdf/$file/BB77.pdf: where 
telephone surveys with 2530 NSW residents found that measures such as better supervision of juveniles, 
better mental health care, treatment for drug addiction and for binge drinking were perceived as being more 
effective at preventing crime and disorder than a prison sentence. Note that this study did not confine the 
questions to juvenile offenders. However, the study cites Pali B and Pelikan C, “Building Social Support for 
Restorative Justice: Media, Civil Society and Citizens” (2010) European Forum for Restorative Justice, which 
provides that support for restorative justice measures is greater for juvenile offenders.  For other examples of 
public responses to naming and shaming see www.facebook.com/townsvillebulletin/posts/501179889896471 
and www.goldcoast.com.au/article/2012/07/18/432255_col-mccleland-opinion.html where the responses are 
mixed.  
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Applying punitive sanctions to juveniles increases recidivism and negatively influences their 
development and mental health.61 Recidivism is a consequence of the label, which limits the 
ability of the juvenile to be reintegrated into society. Recording of criminal convictions for 
juveniles is legislatively restricted on a similar basis.62 Courts are reluctant to record a 
conviction against a juvenile lest it impact on their ability to find employment and their 
chance to become a contributing member of society; limited opportunity for employment is 
one of the main predictors of recidivism.63 Allowing naming effectively removes the 
protection afforded by the non-recording of convictions. Employers may simply engage in an 
internet search to uncover entries where the prospective employee is named. Such 
disclosure of information would not be subject to the limitations inherent in a criminal 
record. A criminal record is often restricted to dates that a person appeared before the 
court, title and date of the offence, name of the court and the sentence imposed.64 A media 
(or other) report naming the offender may potentially reveal much more information about 
the crime and, as the media would not be subject to the same level of oversight as required 
for the recording of an entry onto a criminal record, the information could be incorrect.     
Naming could create more problems than those it attempts to address. Although there is 
evidence to suggest that simply appearing in court does not stigmatise juveniles, the same 
cannot be said for naming, particularly if the Queensland Government’s proposal is adopted. 
Authorising the media to have control over material that has the potential to harm juveniles, 
who may otherwise have had an opportunity to mature and reform, is misguided. The 
question this article now considers is: whether any of the existing approaches of Australian 
states or territories to naming are better tailored to the evidence presented above? 
IV AUSTRALIAN APPROACHES TO IDENTIFYING JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
In most Australian jurisdictions children’s criminal courts are closed to the public.65 However, 
even then, representatives of the media are usually permitted to attend either by right or 
                                                          
61
 Fagan ‘Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes’ (2008) 18(2) The Future of Children 
81. See also Greenwood PW, Changing Lives: Delinquency Prevention as Crime Control Policy (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006).  
62
 For example, Queensland courts who are considering whether to record a conviction against a juvenile must 
have regard to the ‘impact the recording of a conviction will have on the child’s chances of – (i) rehabilitation 
generally; or (ii) finding or retaining employment’: Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 184(1)(c).  
63
 Pager D, “The Mark of a Criminal Record” (2003) 108 Am J Sociol 937.  
64
 The information available depends upon the jurisdiction. The information above is what is readily available 
on the Queensland Criminal History. However, it has been said that ‘[t]he information kept usually includes 
court appearances, convictions and penalty, bonds and findings of guilt where a conviction was not recorded, 
charges, matters awaiting hearing, police intelligence and traffic infringements’: Naylor B, “Do Not Pass Go: 
The Impact of Criminal Record Checks on Employment in Australia” (2005) 30 AltLJ 174 at 176.  
65
 Children’s (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 10 – although the Court may direct that the Court be 
open: s 10(1)(a), see eg, AE v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 203 (10 September 2010) where the Court noted at 
[39] that ‘There is no need for special circumstances to be shown: it is sufficient that the court exercises its 
discretion in the circumstances of the particular case, bearing in mind the underlying purpose of s 10’; 
Children’s Court Act 1992 (Qld), s 20(1) (however note that this provision does not apply to a judge hearing a 
matter upon indictment: s20(5)); Youth Court Act 1993 (SA), s 24; Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas), s 30 (however 
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upon application.66 In jurisdictions where the right to attend is legislated there is usually 
provision to exclude media representatives in particular circumstances.67  In the Northern 
Territory, Victoria and Western Australia children’s courts are not closed, however, upon 
application, or on the court’s own volition, can be closed or can require the exclusion of 
particular categories of persons (such as media representatives).68 As such, assuming that 
general deterrence is necessary and/or justified for juvenile offenders, the media’s ability to 
attend and publish information, other than identifying information, is adequately framed for 
this purpose in Australia. For more serious offences, media representatives can be and are 
permitted to attend as exceptions to the rule in closed courts or because a court is open. For 
example, in AE v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 2003 (10 September 2010) the Court considered 
that given the seriousness of the offence (robbery in company with wounding), the 
accused’s age of 17 years, and the protection provided by the prohibition on the publication 
of his name, the principle of open justice favoured opening the court. Yet in most 
jurisdictions the court retains the discretion to exclude persons or close the court should 
other interests be at stake.  
As to naming juveniles, there are three broad approaches taken in the Australian states and 
territories: the expansive approach, the approach that provides for an exception to the 
prohibition against naming for serious offences and the approach that retains a 
presumption against naming.  
A The Expansive Approach 
When media representatives are permitted to attend court there is generally a prohibition 
against publication of any identifying material related to juvenile offenders.69 The situation 
in the Northern Territory is an exception. There publication is permitted unless the court 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
this provision relates only to Magistrates Courts (youth justice division): s 3); Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT), 
s 72.  
66
 By right in: Children’s (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 10(1)(b); Youth Court Act 1993 (SA), s 
24(1)(f)(ii); Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT), s 72(1)(i). By application in: Children’s Court Act 1992 (Qld), s 
20(2)(c): allows the court to permit a representative of the mass media to be present; Youth Justice Act 1997 
(Tas), s 30(1)(n): allows other persons to be present if the court considers the ‘interests of justice’ require their 
presence.  
67
 Children’s (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 10(1)(b): media representatives can attend unless the 
court otherwise directs. Such an order was made in R v AA, AS, MH & OM [2009] NSWDC 25 (20 February 2009) 
(and confirmed in the same case in R v AA, AS, MH & OM [2009] NSWDC 40 (27 February 2009) in unique 
circumstances in which the juveniles concerned had been earlier identified (although perhaps inadvertently) in 
the media and given that the prohibition on publication may have been ineffective to protect the juveniles’ 
identity in that instance); Youth Court Act 1993 (SA), s 24(2): the court may exclude persons if it considers it ‘in 
the interests of the proper administration of justice’ to do so. The exception is the Australian Capital Territory, 
which does not provide statutorily for the exclusion of the media.  
68
 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 523(2): allows full or partial closure upon application; 
Children’s Court of Western Australia Act 1988 (WA), s 31(1): allows a court to make such an order where the 
‘interests of a child may be prejudicially affected’; Youth Justice Act 2005 (NT), s 49(2): allows a court to make 
such an order where it would best serve justice.  
69
 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), s 712A; Children’s (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15A; Youth Justice Act 
1992 (Qld), s 301; Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA), s 13; Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas), s 31; Children, Youth and 
Families Act (Vic), s 534; Children’s Court of Western Australia Act 1988 (WA), s 35. 
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orders otherwise.70 Such an order will usually only be considered upon the application of 
the accused’s lawyer. However, it is not accurate to say that ‘because the Court is open to 
the public unless otherwise ordered, there is a presumption in favour of the defendant’s 
name being published which can only be displaced if the circumstances are exceptional.’71 
Rather, the court has an unfettered discretion and once good reasons are presented to 
justify suppression of a juvenile’s identity the court must  
weigh in the balance the fact now almost universally acknowledged by international 
conventions, State legislatures and experts in child psychiatry, psychology and 
criminology, that the publication of a child offender’s identity often serves no 
legitimate criminal justice objective, is usually psychologically harmful to the 
adolescents involved and acts negatively toward their rehabilitation.72 
The appeal in MCT v McKinney (2006) 18 NTLR 222 was from a decision by the Chief 
Magistrate refusing to make an order for non-publication regarding a juvenile, aged 14/15 
at the time of offending, who had no previous convictions and had pleaded guilty to a 
number of offences.73 The appeal was allowed. An order prohibiting publication was made 
considering the abovementioned factors, because publication of identifying material would 
potentially ‘be detrimental to his employment prospects and … adversely affect his 
rehabilitation’ and because there was an absence of evidence that the offender represented 
a continuing danger to the community.74  
On the face of the legislation, the Northern Territory approach is the most controversial. It is 
in this jurisdiction that, potentially, publication of identification material is the most likely, 
and naming has indeed occurred.75 The onus seems to remain largely on an accused (or 
their representative) to prevent publication, however, the court has shown it is alive to the 
research discussed above, especially the impacts of labelling. In addition, Chappell and 
Lincoln reported that even when there was a right to publish, the media often refrained, 
either because of the ethical constraints of individual journalists, the policy of their 
organisation, or purely for practical reasons.76   
The retention of judicial discretion to close the court at least provides some protection 
against indiscriminate application of naming, allowing proportionality to remain at the 
forefront of the court’s decision. One questions though whether the court’s discretion may 
have been exercised differently had MCT been a repeat offender, leaving the media with 
                                                          
70
 Youth Justice Act 2005 (NT), s 50(1).  
71
 MCT v McKinney (2006) 18 NTLR 222 at [18].  
72
 MCT v McKinney (2006) 18 NTLR 222 at [20]. The Court expressly accepted the approach of R v Lee (1993) 1 
WLR 103 at 110.  
73
 2 x Stealing; 1 x Assault; 1 x Assault Occasioning Bodily Harm; 2 x Unlawfully Damaging Property and 1 x 
Robbery.  
74
 MCT v McKinney (2006) 18 NTLR 222 at [30](7)-(8). 
75
 See discussion of the Northern Territory experience in Chappell and Lincoln, n 16.   
76
 Chappell and Lincoln, n 16 at 75-83.  
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virtually unbridled ability to publish his details and providing therefore a barrier to his 
rehabilitation. 77 Chappell and Lincoln found that media reporting on juvenile crime in the 
Northern Territory was ‘exemplified by peaks and troughs’ and various factors, such as 
whether journalists were present and interested, whether the story was newsworthy, and 
the nature of competing material, led to inconsistency of treatment.78 Such inconsistency 
may result in offender perceptions of unfairness, which is antithetical to the idea of 
reintegrative shaming. Relinquishing control of naming to the media also demonstrates a 
significant problem in attributing a deterrence justification, either specific or general, above 
and beyond those problems previously identified.79 That is, if the media are left to choose 
whether to communicate the outcome the deterrence purpose will potentially be 
undermined. Apart from these issues, the Northern Territory experience provides anecdotal 
evidence in support of the negative impacts of labelling discussed above, including affects 
on ‘education, employment, and ongoing contact with the juvenile justice system.’80  
B The Serious Offence Exception Approach 
Queensland and New South Wales both prohibit naming, with exceptions allowed by court 
order in cases involving certain serious crimes. 81  
In Queensland the exception to non-publication applies to juveniles charged with 
particularly heinous life offences, involving the commission of violence, where the court 
considers it would be in the interests of justice to allow publication.82 That jurisdiction 
requires regard to be paid to, inter alia, community protection needs and the impact of 
publication on the juvenile’s rehabilitation.83 Life offences that may involve violence in 
Queensland include offences such as murder, manslaughter, intent to cause grievous bodily 
harm, rape and robbery with violence. The courts have explained particularly heinous as 
‘odious, highly criminal, infamous’84 or ‘reprehensible.’85 Determining whether an offence is 
particularly heinous requires the court to consider all the circumstances of the offence, 
including the juvenile’s role in it.86 This approach can potentially recognise that the nature 
of adolescent development may reduce a juvenile’s culpability.  
                                                          
77
 Chappell and Lincoln, n 16 at 93 report an interview with a lawyer who noted that ‘I have had quite a few 
kids had their names suppressed but it is almost always because it is very early on in the piece like their first 
offence.’  
78
 Chappell and Lincoln, n 16 at 75.  
79
 O’Leary J and Lincoln R, ‘Look Before Leaping into a Human Rights Quagmire’ on Centre for Law Governance 
and Public Policy Blog (17 July 2012), lawgovpolicy.com/2012/07/17/look-before-leaping-into-a-human-rights-
quagmire/#more-68. 
80
 Chappell and Lincoln, n 16 at 91. 
81
 Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 301(1)-(2); Children’s (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), ss 15A, 15C.  
82
 Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 234(2). 
83
 Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 234(2).  
84
 R v Gwilliams [1997] QCA 389 (31 October 1997).  
85
 R v Maygar; ex parte A-G (Qld); R v WT; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2007] QCA 310 (28 September 2007) at [74].  
86
 For example in R v WT; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2007] QCA 310 (28 September 2007) at [78] it was noted that 
‘[t]he question is whether all the circumstances of the murder show that the child’s offence was particularly 
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Along with the requirement of heinousness, the interests of justice discretion, retained by 
the judge, significantly and appropriately narrows the ambit of offences to which the 
exception allowing publication could apply. Since the introduction of the legislation in 2002, 
publication has been rare.87 In R v SBU [2012] 1 Qd R 250 the decision to name a juvenile 
convicted of murder, who was aged 14 at the time of the offence, was overturned on appeal, 
recognising the potential detriment of labelling. The Court took into account the seriousness 
of the offending but stated that ‘the community also has an interest in the applicant’s 
rehabilitation, which would likely be prejudiced by allowing the publication of his identifying 
information.’88 However, the exclusion of 17 year olds from the juvenile justice system in 
Queensland may partly explain the scarcity of publication orders in that jurisdiction. Those 
who are 17 are automatically exposed to publication in the same way as adults, despite the 
fact that developmentally they may still lag behind.    
The New South Wales exception allows a court to authorise publication relating to a juvenile 
charged with a serious children’s indictable offence, such as homicide; an offence 
punishable by life or 25 years (eg, manslaughter, intent to wound or cause grievous bodily 
harm, robbery whilst armed with a dangerous weapon); or aggravated sexual assault.89  To 
determine whether to authorise publication the court must have regard to: 
(a) the level of seriousness of the offence concerned,  
(b) the effect of the offence on any victim of the offence and (in the case of an 
offence that resulted in the death of the victim) the effect of the offence on the 
victim’s family,  
(c) the weight to be given to general deterrence,  
(d) the subjective features of the offender,  
(e) the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation,  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
heinous, not whether the child is criminally responsible with others for an offence which is particularly heinous. 
In this case, those circumstances included the fact that he was acting under compulsion, had good reason to 
fear for his life and to seek to mollify Maygar and Woodman, and the fact that his conduct was not perceived 
as threatening by the other hostages.’ This meant that WT’s offence was not considered particularly heinous 
and he was not named.  
87
 It was reported in 2010 by Ironside R, ‘Michael Thompson's Killer Walks Free, Paul de Jersey Calls for Serious 
Juvenile Offenders to be Named’, The Courier Mail (online), 22 October 2010, 
www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/michael-thompsons-killer-walks-free-paul-de-jersey-calls-for-
serious-juvenile-offenders-to-be-named/story-e6freoof-1225941980968 that three juveniles had been named:  
Woodman (a juvenile co-offender of Maygar and WT was named, although as noted above, WT was not); 
Whitehouse; and Rowlingson: see R v Rowlingson [2008] QCA 395 (9 December 2008). All three were charged 
with murder (with Woodman charged with multiple offences, including rape).  
88
 R v SBU [2012] 1 Qd R 250 at [38]. 
89
 Children’s (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15C(1). For the other serious children’s indictable 
offence see s 3 ‘Definitions’.   
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(f) such other matters as the court considers relevant having regard to the interests 
of justice.90 
This power to name was exercised in the notorious case of R v Milat & Klein [2012] NSWSC 
634 (8 June 2012), where the accused was one month shy of 18 at the time of murdering a 
friend. An earlier version of a similar provision of the Children’s (Criminal Proceedings) Act 
1987 (NSW) was also considered in Application by John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd re MSK, 
MAK, MMK and MRK [2006] NSWCCA 386 (1 December 2006). In that case the Court of 
Criminal Appeal refused to allow publication of the offender’s identifying particulars for 
charges of aggravated sexual assault in company. However, the decision was based on a 
jurisdictional limitation rather than a substantive one. Spigelman CJ noted that 
[t]he heinous nature of the systematic course of predatory conduct indicates that 
this is an appropriate case in which the additional element of public shaming could 
fulfil the function of retribution and also the function of general deterrence that 
criminal sentences are designed to serve. There may well be a strong case for the 
exercise of the discretion.91 
Although Spigelman CJ also expressed that ‘the power to authorise publication should not 
be exercised for the purpose of punishment’,92 the references to retribution and general 
deterrence earlier in the decision, and the requirement to consider general deterrence in 
the legislation, militate against this. As previously explained, general deterrence is not an 
appropriate justification for naming. Further, the absence of the requirement of 
heinousness, suggests that the New South Wales provisions could apply more broadly to 
juveniles than the Queensland legislation.93  
The legislation in both Queensland and New South Wales attempts to ensure that the public 
interest is satisfied but that considerations of proportionality are not overwhelmed. It does 
so by confining the application of naming to particularly serious offences, which are 
generally going to attract lengthy periods of imprisonment and have convictions recorded 
regardless. This way also ensures that there is more consistency and less selectivity 
regarding who is subjected to the potential publication order. As required by Braithwaite’s 
reintegrative shaming approach, the emphasis in those states is appropriately focused on 
the offence rather than the offender. However, the obvious downfall is that named 
offenders are not going to be reintegrated into their community. Instead they will be 
incarcerated with others from a deviant out group and may relish their criminal reputation. 
                                                          
90
 Children’s (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15C(3).  
91
 Application by John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd re MSK, MAK, MMK and MRK [2006] NSWCCA 386 (1 
December 2006) at [9]. 
92
 Application by John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd re MSK, MAK, MMK and MRK [2006] NSWCCA 386 (1 
December 2006) at [18]. 
93
 Although the author’s research did not reveal a significant difference between the number of juveniles 
named in New South Wales and those in Queensland.  
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Any desirable feelings of guilt and associated accountability that may be felt upon entry into 
institutional life will likely dissipate by the time of their release.94 
C The Presumption Against Naming Approach 
The most common approach to naming, followed in the Australian Capital Territory,95 South 
Australia,96 Tasmania,97 Victoria,98 and Western Australia,99 is a presumption against 
publication. Generally the publication of a juvenile’s identity is prohibited, with specific 
exceptions. One exception is where consent to publish has been provided once a juvenile 
has become an adult.100 The more common exception authorises the court to permit 
publication.101  
Applications have been made to the President of the Children’s Court in Victoria to approve 
publication.102 One such application, relating to bail variation proceedings for the alleged 
offences of causing a public nuisance and making child pornography, was unsuccessful.103 
The Court quoted Justice Rehnquist who stressed that naming juvenile offenders ‘may 
seriously impair the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and handicap the 
youths’ prospects for adjustment in society and acceptance by the public.’104 President 
Grant remarked in the course of the judgment that he did not know of any orders 
permitting publication since the most recent iteration of the legislation.105 He explained that 
there were two orders under the previous equivalent provision. One was made to protect 
the community from an escaped juvenile regarded as a risk. The other was done with the 
consent of the juvenile and his family. The Judge elucidated that naming would not be 
restricted to only these types of cases, but they were ‘examples, of cases that move beyond 
mere “public interest.”’106 
                                                          
94
 Such a result was found in Hosser, Windzio and Greve, n 53. 
95
 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), s 712A.   
96
 Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA), s 63C.  
97
 In Tasmania, restrictions on reporting in the Magistrates (Youth Justice Division) Court is provided for in the 
Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas), s 31, but this restriction is extended to the Supreme Court and other Magistrates 
Courts for proceedings relating to juveniles charged with offences: s 108.  
98
 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 534. The words ‘a report of … a proceeding in any other court 
arising out of a proceeding in the Court [being the Children’s Court]’ would seem to encompass certain 
offences that must be dealt with in higher courts (such as the Supreme Court) see: R v SJK & GAS [2011] VSC 
431 (2 September 2011) at [7]. Those courts may also order suppression of identifying material within their 
respective jurisdictions.   
99
 See Children’s Court of Western Australia Act 1998 (WA), s 35(1). However, note that the presumption does 
not usually apply in the case of Supreme or District Court proceedings against a juvenile: s 35(2). See further 
discussion below.  
100
 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), s 712A(3)(a). 
101
 In South Australia and Tasmania the Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA), s 63C(2) and the Youth Justice Act 1997 
(Tas), s 31(2) allows the court to permit publication on such conditions it thinks fit.  
102
 In accordance with the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 534(1)(a). 
103
 HWT v AB [2008] VChC 3 (20 May 2008).   
104
 HWT v AB [2008] VChC 3 (20 May 2008) at [24].  
105
 HWT v AB [2008] VChC 3 (20 May 2008) at [21]. 
106
 HWT v AB [2008] VChC 3 (20 May 2008) at [21].  
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In Western Australia the situation is complicated by the different provisions that apply 
depending on whether the juvenile elects to proceed in the Children’s Court or in the other 
superior courts with a judge a jury. In the Children’s Court the presumption remains against 
publication, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.107 The Supreme Court can 
allow publication after considering the interests of the child (including their age, safety or 
well-being) and the public interest (including in public safety, the apprehension of escapees 
and the prevention or detection of crime).108 Such an order was made for a juvenile who 
escaped from detention while serving a sentence for two counts of manslaughter.109  
Where the juvenile elects to proceed in another superior court, the presumption is in favour 
of publication unless the public interest and interests of the child dictate that publication 
should not be permitted and a suppression order is granted.110 The judiciary has condemned 
this legislative distinction in successive judgments.111 Research for this article uncovered 
three judgments relating to this section. Publication was permitted in one case and refused 
in the other two.112 When it was refused, the justification offered was based on the 
detrimental impacts of labelling on the juvenile’s rehabilitation. For example, in R v MJM 
(2000) 24 SR (WA) 253 at 255 [8] where the accused (who were at least 17) were charged 
with unlawful detention and multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault, Muller J said: 
 Publication of the names of the juveniles carries the potential of damaging their 
 reputation in the wider community and possibly jeopardising their chances of 
 rehabilitation... publication of their names will stigmatise them to the point where 
 their chances of rehabilitation might be jeopardised.  
The distinction that exists in Western Australia is undesirable. There is no principled reason 
for the difference between children’s courts and other courts dealing with juveniles. Both 
courts deal with juveniles, who are unique from adults. The presumption against publication 
available in the Western Australian Children’s Court and in Victoria, South Australia, 
Tasmania and the Australia Capital Territory, is more in line with the research that suggests 
little support for naming as a deterrent and instead acknowledges the stigmatising effects 
and their negative impact on juveniles’ rehabilitation efforts. The presumption against 
publication has appropriately confined publication to very rare occasions where a juvenile 
provides immediate danger to the community, such as upon escape. 
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 Children’s Court of Western Australia Act 1998 (WA), s 35(1). Non-publication is also circumvented in some 
respects where a juvenile is subject to Prohibited Behaviour Order: as discussed in Crofts and Witzleb, n 30.  
108
 Children’s Court of Western Australia Act 1998 (WA), s 36A. 
109
 The Commissioner of Police v A Child [1992] WASC 2088 (3 September 1992).  
110
 Children’s Court of Western Australia Act 1998 (WA), s 35(2). 
111
 See R v H (A Child) (1995) 83 A Crim R 350 and within that a reference to R v Crimp [1995] WASC 304 (5 May 
1995).  
112
 In R v Crimp  [1995] WASC 304 (5 May 1995) referred to in R v H (A Child) (1995) 83 A Crim R 350, the Court 
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V ALIGNING REFORM WITH RESEARCH 
Any reform to juvenile justice must be evidence-based.113 Of course it is not only juvenile 
justice that would benefit from policy informed by evidence. However, the ramifications of 
implementing reforms that evidence suggests could potentially be harmful and offer little by 
way of achieving the social goal of reducing reoffending is especially problematic for juvenile 
offenders. Getting it wrong for these offenders could potentially exacerbate reoffending 
rates, not only for juveniles but also as they grow into adults. There is a danger that the 
transient juvenile offender population will become entrenched and move into the adult 
system as they mature.  
The Queensland Government’s proposal to expand the naming laws to recidivist juvenile 
offenders does not align with the developments that have been made in research relating to 
juvenile development and offending. Based on this research, naming recidivist juveniles is 
ineffective as a deterrent and instead could prove stigmatising and work against the 
rehabilitative goal of the juvenile justice system; a goal that is in the public’s interest.  
Certainly the Northern Territory experience does not bode well for the proposed measure in 
Queensland. Based on the reports of the number of juveniles named, some may describe 
Queensland’s current approach as somewhere between the expansive approach in the 
Northern Territory and the jurisdictions, like Victoria, where there is a presumption against 
naming. The current Queensland approach still offers little by way of deterrent impact and 
could potentially harm the juvenile’s future prospects. However, at least it is confined 
strictly in its legislative application, attaches to the offence rather than the offender and 
allows for individualisation through judicial oversight. If nothing else, it is preferable to 
maintain the status quo in Queensland. However, if the Queensland Government 
contemplates evidence-based policy it should learn from the majority of other Australian 
jurisdictions, which retain a strict presumption against naming (with exceptions that are 
usually required to go beyond appeals to mere public interest in knowing the identity of the 
offender, instead, for example, requiring some pressing concern for public safety.) Those 
jurisdictions demonstrate best practice. 
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